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Abstract: Using a macroeconomic model with asset prices, we analyze how optimal monetary 
policy, and macroeconomic dynamics and performance are affected by the central bank’s desire 
to be robust against model misspecifications. Considering the worst-case model, we show that an 
increase in the central bank’s preference for robustness requires a more aggressive reaction of the 
optimal nominal interest rate with respect to expected inflation and inflation shocks. According 
to the value of structural parameters, the economic equilibrium can be stable or saddle-point 
stable. In both cases, the speed of dynamic convergence is smaller under robust control compared 
to a benchmark case without it. Finally, an increase in the preference for robustness reinforces the 
reaction of current and expected future inflation, asset prices and output-gap to inflation shocks. 
However, the preference for robustness has no effect on the reaction of asset prices to the shocks 
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In the last decade, many central banks have succeeded to stabilise inflation at low levels in 
introducing the inflation-targeting framework. However, some economists doubt that this 
environment might have favoured large swings in asset prices.1 According to the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS, 2007), “our understanding of economic processes may even be 
less today than it was in the past”. The reason is an increase in fundamental uncertainties about 
how the economy works. In fact, technological progress and globalization have transformed the 
production. Meanwhile, financial innovations bring new uncertainties into the financial system 
by introducing incessantly new products whose risks are often not well evaluated by market 
operators and regulators. 
In this new economic environment, recent researches have developed different approaches 
to robust monetary policy design in order to tackle the economic and financial uncertainties. 
Without the possibility to have a complete description of reality, a policymaker is likely to 
prefer basing policy on principles that are valid also if the assumptions on which the model is 
founded differ from reality. In other words, policy prescriptions should be robust to 
reasonable deviations from the benchmark model. The growing literature on monetary policy 
robustness has been developed into three directions2. The first one leads to what has been called 
robustly optimal instrument rules (Svensson and Woodford, 2004; Giannoni and Woodford, 
2003a, 2003b). As these instrument rules do not depend on the specification of the generating 
                                                           
1 According to Borio and Lowe (2002), low inflation can promote financial imbalances, regardless of the underlying 
cause of an asset price boom. For example, by generating optimism about the macroeconomic environment, low 
inflation might cause asset prices to rise more in response to an increase in productivity growth than they otherwise 
would.   3
processes of exogenous disturbances in the model, they are, therefore, robust to misspecification 
in these processes. The second one, initiated by Hansen and Sargent (2001, 2003, 2007), 
corresponds to robust control approach to the decision problem of agents who face model 
uncertainty. This approach to model uncertainty focuses exclusively on the worst-case outcome 
within a set of admissible models. In the sense of Hansen and Sargent, robust monetary policies 
are designed to perform well in worst-case scenarios, by minimizing the consequences of the 
worst-case specification of the policymaker’s reference model. These policies arise as the 
equilibrium in a game between the monetary authorities and an evil agent who chooses additive 
model misspecification to make the authorities look as bad as possible. While these two 
approaches to robust policies appear quite distinct, Walsh (2004) has demonstrated that both 
approaches lead to exactly the same implicit optimal instrument rule for the policy maker in a 
standard, forward-looking, new Keynesian model. The third approach to robustness considers the 
structured Knightian uncertainty. It is assumed that the uncertainty is located in one or more 
specific parameters of the model, but the true values of these parameters are known only to be 
bounded between minimum and maximum conceivable values (Onatski and Stock, 2002; 
Giannoni, 2002, 2007; Tetlow and von zur Muehlen, 2004). What these three approaches share is 
a focus on the concept of uncertainty in the sense of Knight instead of that of risk.3 
However, the literature on monetary policy robustness treats generally model uncertainties 
affecting the Phillips curve and the IS equation (in closed-economy models) as well as the 
uncovered interest rate parity (in open economy models), neglecting the role of asset prices and 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
2 Another current of research studies the robustness of a monetary policy rule across different models (Lucas-type 
transmission mechanism, backward-looking and forward-looking models). See e.g. Levin  and Williams (2003). 
3 These approaches are more appropriate if policymakers face Knightian uncertainty and therefore be unable to 
assign probabilities to alternative specifications of its model. In contrast, in the Bayesian approach, central banks 
would take into account all possible outcomes in the specified model set and assign weights to each competing 
model according to its perceived probability (e.g. Batini et al., 2006; Brock et al., 2007).    4
the misspecification affecting asset pricing. In contrast, the work of Tetlow (2006) studies model 
uncertainty affecting only asset prices.  
Meanwhile, ignoring model misspecifications, recent studies on the relationship between 
asset prices and monetary policy consider the benefits of allowing the monetary authority to 
respond to asset prices in a monetary policy rule. The essential question is not about whether the 
central bank’s objective function should include asset prices, but how an inflation-targeting 
central bank can most effectively fulfill its objectives. A more general case can be made for 
central banks to react to asset prices in the normal course of policy making without trying to 
target asset prices (e.g. Cecchetti et al., 2000; Cecchetti et al., 2003; Filardo, 2000, 2004; Bean, 
2003; Disyatat, 2005; Akram and Eitrheim, 2008; and Gilchrist and Saito, 2008). Bernanke and 
Gertler (1999, 2001) suggest that monetary policy should not respond to changes in asset prices, 
except in so far as they signal changes in expected inflation. This topic seems very crucial since 
responding to asset price fluctuations is likely to increase significantly macroeconomic stability 
only if bubbles are identified in their infancy, which is by definition the time when they are most 
difficult to identify. But, even if one could successfully identify bubbles, there are other reasons 
why a monetary authority might not react directly to asset prices since the monetary authorities 
might not have an exact model describing the price dynamics of financial assets. In fact, many 
financial prices are noisy and volatile making signal extraction difficult. Furthermore, current 
asset prices reflect expectations about future monetary policy and risk premium integrated in 
asset prices tends to vary over time. 
Using the dynamic framework of Bernanke et al. (1999), Tetlow (2006) introduces 
parametric model uncertainty by assuming that the central bank only knows the range in which 
the growth rate of the stock prices lies. Tetlow has focused only on misspecifications of the   5
growth rate of asset prices with an application to the US economy in the presence of stock market 
bubbles. He has found that a direct reaction to stock prices in a policy rule reduces inflation and 
output volatility only marginally. However, the approach of parametric model uncertainty needs 
numerical simulations to appreciate the properties of the solutions. 
The aim of our paper is to contribute to the literature of robust monetary policy by studying 
how the robust control approach of Hansen and Sargent (2007) affects the relationship between 
monetary policies and asset prices as well as the dynamic stability of the economic system. The 
choice of this approach is motivated by the fact that it allows us to obtain closed-form solutions 
for the optimal robust policy and the equilibrium behaviour of the economy. We can therefore 
discuss analytically the macroeconomic performance and dynamics of the economy in 
considering different model regime shifts due to modifications of exogenous parameters or model 
misspecifications. 
We also allow, following Leitemo and Söderström (2008b), the policymaker’s preference 
for robustness to differ across equations, reflecting the confidence the policymaker has in each 
relationship. Hence, we consider several different types of misspecification within the model, 
affecting respectively firms’ price-setting, consumer behaviour and determination of asset prices. 
Then, it is possible to examine the effect of each particular misspecification on the robust 
monetary policy. The importance of the ability to focus on specification errors in particular 
equations is justified on the ground that policymakers are more confident in some relationships 
than in others, and so regard some types of specification errors to be more important than others. 
In the presence of asset prices, monetary policymakers are particularly uncertain about 
interactions between monetary policy, the asset prices and the economy. Adopting this approach,   6
we are able to analyze the design of monetary policy under such specific model uncertainty while 
keeping other potential sources of misspecification fixed. 
The seminal analysis of Brainard (1967) has shown that increased uncertainty about the 
effects of policy should lead generally to more cautious policy behaviour. However, introducing 
Knightian model uncertainty, it has been shown that an increased preference for robustness tends 
to lead to more aggressive policy behaviour in closed economy (e.g, Onatski and Stock, 2002; 
Hansen and Sargent, 2001; Giannoni, 2002; Giordani and Söderlind, 2004; Leitemo and 
Söderström, 2008a). Leitemo and Söderström (2008b) show that this result does not carry over to 
the open economy where the optimal robust policy can be either more aggressive or more 
cautious than the non-robust policy. 
We show in the present paper that the closed economy results about the robust policy are not 
modified by the introduction of asset prices, independently of on the source of misspecification 
and the type of disturbance affecting the economy. In effect, the asset prices have some similar 
properties than the exchange rate. However, they do not affect, as that is the case for the latter, 
the Phillips curve.  
A second set of results concerns the effects on the macroeconomic dynamics of the central 
bank’s preference for model robustness. This preference modifies the reaction of the nominal 
interest rate to the expected future inflation and asset prices and hence influences the dynamic 
stability of the economy. Generally, the dynamic stability of the economy is not affected but the 
speed of convergence to the equilibrium is reduced when the preference for robustness increases.  
In the next section, we lay down a stylised macroeconomic model with asset prices. In the 
section after, we study the dynamic stability of the economy when monetary policy is conducted 
without model uncertainty. In the fourth section, we derive the optimal robust policy for the   7
worst-case model and examine the effect of the preference for robustness on the macroeconomic 
and financial stability. In the fifth section, we solve for the equilibrium solutions of endogenous 
variables under robust control and study their sensibilities to the preference for robustness. We 
summarize our findings and conclude in the last section. 
 
2. A stylised macroeconomic model with asset prices 
 
Our stylised system of macroeconomic equations is the following4: 
π ε δ π β π t t t t t y + + Ε = +1 , with  1 0 < β <  and  0 > δ ,     (1) 
d
t t t t t t t t A E i y E y ε α π α + + − − = + + 2 1 1 1 ) ( , with  1 α , 0 2 > α ,    (2) 
e
t t t t t t t t t E i A E y A ε π γ ε γ






t e 1 1 + + + = ε ρ ε ,   with  e d j , , π =  ;  1 0 ≤ ≤ j ρ  and  0 1 = +
j
t te E  ;  (4) 
where  t π  denotes the inflation rate,  1 + t t Eπ  the private sector’s expectation of future inflation 
with  t E  as the expectation operator reflecting the hypothesis of rational expectations,  t y  the 
output gap,   t A  the equity price,  1 + t tA E  the expected equity price,  t i  the nominal interest rate, 
π εt  
an inflation or cost shock, 
d
t ε  the demand shock  and 
e
t ε  a disturbance which represents an 
equity premium shock of the type discussed in Cecchetti et al. (2000).  
Equation (1) is a forward-looking Phillips curve based on optimizing private sector 
behaviour and nominal rigidities that has been used extensively in the recent literature on 
monetary policy (Clarida et al., 1999). The parameter β  represents the private discount factor 
                                                           
4 A similar model is used by Alexandre and Bação (2005) except for their hybrid Phillips curve. 
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which is positive but inferior to unity. The parameter δ  is the output gap elasticity of inflation 
and captures the effects of the gap on real marginal costs and marginal cost on inflation. 
Equation (2) is the aggregate demand (or IS) equation and, except for the asset price term, 
can be derived from a dynamic general equilibrium model with optimising agents (McCallum 
and Nelson, 1999). As in Alexandre and Bação (2005), an ad hoc term ( t A 2 α ) is added to 
incorporate a wealth effect5 and which can be justified on the ground that it is a shortcut within 
the spirit of the debate about the role of asset prices in the transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy (see, e.g., Cecchetti et al., 2000).  
Equation (3) is derived from a standard dividend model of asset pricing. Fundamental real 
equity prices are a function of next-period dividends assumed to depend positively on current 
output and the supply shock, expected future dividends (incorporated into the expected equity 
price), and negatively on the real interest rate. This is supported by the majority of empirical 
studies examining the effect of macroeconomic variables on the stock market6.  
Finally, equation (4) defines the shocks in the system as first-order autoregressive processes 
where  j ρ  represents the degree of persistence. 
 
3. Design of monetary policy without model uncertainty 
 
Consider a benchmark case where the central bank knows exactly the true structure of 
the economy. Monetary policy is then implemented to minimize the conditional expectation of 
the central bank’s loss function: 
                                                           
5 Disyatat (2005), Kontonikas and Ioannidis (2005), Akram and Eitrheim (2006), and Kontonikas and  Montagnoli 
(2006) have also introduced similarly wealth effect on aggregate demand and have formulated dynamic equations of 
asset prices which are different from the one used in this model.   9
] ) ( ) ( [
2
1 2 * 2 y y E L t
T
t t − + − = π π λ .          ( 5 )  
Where  λ  denotes the relative weight that the central bank assigns to the inflation target, the 
inflation target
T π  and 
* y  the output gap target.  
The first-order condition is: 
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According to equation (8), the nominal interest rate is raised when there is an increase in the 
inflation expectations, in the expected output gap, in the asset prices as well as when there is a 
positive demand shock or a negative inflation shock. A reaction to current asset prices allows the 
monetary authorities to indirectly take account of current output, but also the expected asset 
prices (that a central banker is generally reluctant to predict) and shocks affecting asset pricing.  
                                                                                                                                                                                            
6 See, among others, Fama (1981), Conover, Jensen and Johnson (1999). 
7 An alternative interest rate rule is to determine the optimal interest rate only in terms of expected future variables 
and exogenous shocks. However, central banks might be reluctant to base their interest rate decision on expected 
future asset prices. 
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In order to study the macro-financial stability of the economy, we construct a dynamic system 
with two endogenous variables, i.e. inflation and asset prices. Taking conditional expectations of 
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Proof. The stability matrix of the dynamic system (12) has two eigenvalues  β
λδ 2 1
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+ < , their values are superior to unity. That ensures, when the system is 
perturbed, the convergence to the equilibrium whatever the nature of these dynamic variables 





+ > , then the second eigenvalue will be inferior   11
to unity. In this case, the system will have one stable and one instable eigenvalue. It will be 
characterized by a saddle-point stable equilibrium under the assumption that asset prices are a 
non-predetermined variable and expected inflation rate a predetermined one.  Q.E.D. 
 
The assumption introduced above can be justified on the ground that asset prices adjust more 
quickly than expected inflation in a low inflation environment. Asset prices, particularly these 
quoted in continuous time on a centralized market, are much more flexible than goods prices and 
wages. They are free to make discrete instantaneous jumps in response to “news” concerning all 
previously unanticipated current or future changes in exogenous variables and policy 
instruments. Therefore, the asset prices,  t A , clearing an efficient financial market, are considered 
as a non-predetermined variable. On the other hand, in a low inflation environment, inflation rate 
and hence expected inflation ( t π  and  1 + Ε t tπ ), resulting from a relatively slow adjustment of 
goods prices and wages due to different factors (such as menu costs, overlapping contracts or 
partial adjustment), are considered as a predetermined variable8. This distinction is essentially 
based on the relative speed of adjustment of these two variables. 
 
4. Monetary policy under model uncertainty  
 
Although the central bank perceives the benchmark model described by equations (1), (2) and 
(3) as the most likely specification, it realizes that the true model may deviate from the 
benchmark without, however, being able to specify a probability distribution for deviations. To 
                                                           
8 See e.g. Buiter and Panigirtzoglou (2003) for a similar assumption concerning inflation rate. In practice, if all price 
and wage contracts are short term and/or if inflation is high (i.e. superior to the cost of price and wage adjustment for   12
take account of such misspecifications, we introduce in equations (1), (2) and (3) a second type 
of disturbances, respectively denoted by  t h ,  t w  and  t u . The disturbances are controlled, in the 
sense of Hansen and Sargent (2007), by a fictitious “evil agent” representing the policymaker’s 
worst fears concerning specification errors. Thus, the model with misspecifications is given by 
t t t t t t h y + + + Ε = +
π ε δ π β π 1 ,   with  1 0 < β < ,  0 > δ ,      ( 1 3 )  
t
d
t t t t t t t t w A E i y E y + + + − − = + + ε α π α 2 1 1 1 ) ( , with  1 α , 0 2 > α ,    (14) 
t
e
t t t t t t t t t u E i A E y A + + − − + − = + + ε π γ ε γ
π ) ( ) ( 1 1 2 1 ,     with  1 γ ,  0 2 > γ  (15) 
As it is common in the robust control literature, we assume that the central bank allocates a 
budget 































t u E χ ρ .        ( 1 8 )    
To design the robust monetary policy, the central bank takes into account a certain degree of 
model misspecifications by minimizing its objective function in the worst possible model within 
a given set of plausible models. Monetary policy is implemented to minimize the conditional 
expectation of the loss function. The robust monetary policy is obtained by solving the min-max 
problem 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
all firms and trade union) and they reacts in a forward-looking manner, we can also consider current and expected 
inflation as jumping variable.   13
{}{} ∑
∞
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t t t t
θ θ θ π λ ,    (19) 
subject to the misspecified model (14)–(15) and the evil agent’s budget constraints (16)–(18). 
The central bank sets the nominal interest rate to minimize the value of its intertemporal loss 
function, whereas the evil agent creates misspecifications to maximize the central bank’s loss 
given its budget constraints. The parameters  i θ ,  u w h i   , ,   = , determine the set of models available 
to the evil agent that the policymaker wants to be robust against. They represent the central bank 
preference for robustness: the higher the value  i θ , the lower is the preference for robustness. 
They are related to the evil agent’s budget: as  0
2 → χ ,  ∞ → i θ , and the model specification 
errors approach zero.  
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where 
j
t μ ,  A y j   , ,  π = ,  are Lagrange multipliers on the constraints (13), (14) and (15) 
respectively. The first-order conditions for the min-max problem are: 
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t μ μ . Using this result and conditions 
(25) and (26), we obtain:  
     0 = t w ,           ( 2 7 )  
     0 = t u .          ( 2 8 )  
The optimality conditions (20) and (21) imply that the preference for robustness does not 
influence the optimal trade-off between the inflation and the output gap. The solution of  t w   
given by equation (27) shows that the optimal misspecification in the IS equation is always zero 
as the central bank is able to neutralize misspecification in the output equation by an appropriate 
adjustment of the interest rate. In fact, as discussed by Leitemo and Soderstrom, (2008a, b), the 
central bank does not fear such misspecification because its loss function is not affected by these 
interest rate movements. The same explanation holds for the solution of  t u  given by equation 
(28), meaning that the optimal misspecification in the asset pricing equation (15) is always zero. 
We remark that, in Leitemo and Soderstrom, the exchange rate equation is prone to 
misspecification. Even if asset prices have similar impact on output equation as exchange rate, 
the asset pricing equation in our model is not affected by misspecification. The explanation is   15
that the asset prices do not affect directly the Phillips curve. Meanwhile, the latter is influenced 
by the exchange rate in the model of Leitemo and Soderstrom. 




t μ μ ,  0 = t u  and  0 = t w , the first-order conditions 
(20), (21) and (24) allow to obtain: 
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The second-order conditions, with regard to model misspecifications, of the central bank’s 
min-max problem are obtained in deriving the first-order conditions (24)-(26), taking account of 
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Substituting  t w ,  t π  and  t y , given by equations (27), (34) and (35) respectively, into equation 
(13), we obtain the nominal interest rate rule for the worst-case model as follows:    16
d
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Proposition 2. The reaction of the optimal nominal interest rate to the expected inflation and 
inflation shocks is increasing with the preference for robustness against output misspecification.  
 
Proof. Deriving the nominal interest rate determined by the rule (37) with respect to expected 
inflation and inflation shocks respectively, and then deriving the resulting partial derivatives with 




























.  (38) 
In fact, a higher preference for robustness, which corresponds to a lower  h θ , implies a stronger 
reaction of the optimal nominal interest rate relative to the expected inflation. In other words, an 
increase in output misspecification is equivalent to a positive inflation shock.  Q.E.D. 
 
Proposition 3. The preference for robustness does not change the stability propriety of the 










+ > . 
The only modification introduced by the optimal robust monetary policy is that the speed of 
dynamic convergence to the equilibrium is smaller under robust control compared to the 
benchmark case.  
 
Proof.  The difference equation of expected inflation can be directly obtained from equation (34) 
and that of asset prices can be reformulated using equations (13)-(15), (27)-(29) and (36), to   17
eliminate other endogenous variables, i.e.  t i ,  t y ,  1 + Ε t tπ  and  1 + t ty E  (Appendix A). The system of 
dynamic equations is presented in matrix form as:  
.
) (  
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Under the inflation-targeting regime with robust control, the stability matrix of (39) has two 
eigenvalues:  β θ
θ λδ λ θ
h
h h r E
2
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r E . According to the second-order condition (31), the 
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+ > , the system has one stable eigenvalue and one unstable eigenvalue and 
consequently a saddle-point stable equilibrium, given that the inflation rate is assumed to be a 
predetermined variable and the asset prices a non-predetermined one. 
The second part of the proposition 3 can be proved in comparing 
r E1  and  1 E . In effect, it is 
straightforward to show that the value of the eigenvalue 
r E1  is smaller relative to  1 E  : 
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Since the second eigenvalue is the same under the two monetary policy regimes, i.e. 
1 2
2 1
2 2 α γ
α α + = =
r E E , the speed of convergence of inflation and asset prices to their equilibrium 
values is reduced whenever the central bank has higher preference for robustness (lower value of 
h θ ).  Q.E.D. 
 
5. Model uncertainty and macroeconomic performance 
 
Using the method of indeterminate coefficients (McCallum, 1983) to solve the decomposable 
dynamic system (39), we obtain the equilibrium solutions of  t π ,  1 + t t Eπ ,  t A  and  1 + t tA E  for the 
worst-case model as follows (Appendix B): 
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.      (46) 
The solutions given above show that only asset prices are influenced by shocks affecting 
goods demand and financial markets. Current and expected future inflation and output gap are 
only affected by the inflation shocks as the optimal monetary policy has neutralized the effects of 
other shocks on these variables. The preference for robustness modifies the equilibrium value of 
endogenous variables and therefore their reactions to inflation shocks. Its effects are summarised 
in the following proposition. 
 
Porposition 4.  An increase in the preference for robustness strengthens the reaction of  t π , 
1 + t t Eπ ,  t A ,  1 + t tA E  and  t y  to the inflation shocks. The preference for robustness has no effect on 
the reaction of asset prices to the shocks affecting goods demand and financial markets. 
 
Proof. Deriving twice the solutions of endogenous variables given by equations (41)-(46) 
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Q.E.D. 
 
The above derivatives correspond to the impact of a decrease of the preference for robustness 
(i.e higher value for  h θ ) on the effects of the exogenous shocks on the endogenous variables. For 









 given by (47), a positive inflation shock will increase 
the inflation rate and this effect will be reinforced by an increase in the preference for robustness.  
The central bank does not fear misspecification in the IS and asset pricing equations. 
However, the central bank could fear misspecification in the inflation equation and would 
respond more aggressively to inflation shocks in the worst case model. Consequently, an increase 
in the preference for robustness reinforces the reaction of current and expected future inflation, 
asset prices and output-gap to inflation shocks. Depending positively on real output, asset prices 
will be similarly influenced by an increase in model misspecification. As we have discussed 
before, the central bank does not fear misspecifications affecting the output and asset pricing 
equations. Therefore, the effects of shocks affecting these two equations are not associated with 
the preference for robustness. Furthermore, that the effects of the preference for robustness on the 
expected future values of endogenous variables are associated with the persistence nature of 
inflation shock.    21
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
Using a macroeconomic model with asset prices, we have analyzed how the optimal 
monetary policy and the dynamic behaviour of the economy are affected by the central bank’s 
desire to be robust against model misspecification. Considering the central bank’s worst-case 
model, we have solved analytically for the optimal robust policy and examined its dynamic 
implications as well as its effects on macroeconomic performance. 
In this model, we have shown that the central bank is more confident about the IS and asset 
pricing equations and thus limits the evil agent’s choice of misspecification. However, perceiving 
the inflation equation as being particularly prone to specification errors, the central bank allows 
the evil agent to introduce misspecification. An increase in the central bank’s preference for 
robustness has unambiguous effects on the optimal monetary policy. The reaction of the optimal 
nominal interest rate becomes more sensitive to the expected inflation and inflation shocks, but 
remains unchanged in the presence of shocks affecting goods and financial markets.  
Considering that the model is subject to persistent shocks, we have found that its dynamic 
properties are modified by the introduction of robust control independently of the dynamic 
stability nature of the equilibrium, i.e. stable or saddle-point stable. The speed of dynamic 
convergence is smaller under robust control compared to the benchmark case without robust 
control. 
In terms of macroeconomic performance, an increase in the preference for robustness 
reinforces the reaction of current and expected future inflation, asset prices and output gap to   22
inflation shocks. Furthermore, the preference for robustness has no effect on the reaction of asset 
prices to shocks affecting the demand for goods and financial markets. 
 
 
Appendix A. Difference equation of asset prices 





t t t t E y y E π π λδ − − = + + .             (A.1) 
Using then equations (27), (29), (36) and (A.1) to eliminate  t y  and  1 + t ty E , in equations (13) and 
(14), we get: 
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Equations (A.2) and (A.3) allow us to obtain: 
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Using equations (28), (29) and (A.4) to eliminate  t u   t y  and  1 + t ty E  and  ) ( 1 + − t t t E i π  in equation 
(15) and rearranging the terms yield:  
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Appendix B. Equilibrium solutions under robust control  
The dynamic system (39) is decomposable since the dynamics of expected inflation is 
independent of that of asset prices. We then use equation (34) to find the solution of  t π  and 
1 + Ε t tπ . Using the method of indeterminate coefficients (McCallum, 1983), we assume that: 
  
π ε ϕ ϕ π t t 1 0 + = ,            ( B . 1 )  
and therefore, 
π ε ϕ ϕ π 1 1 0 1 + + + = t t t t E E .             ( B . 2 )  
According to equation (4), it follows under the hypothesis of rational expectations:  
. 1 1
π π π π ε ρ ε ρ ε t s t t t t s t t e E E E = + = + +          ( B . 3 )  
Using the result given in (B.3) in the assumed solution of the expected future inflation (B.2), we 
obtain: 
π ε ρ ϕ ϕ π t s t t E 1 0 1 + = + .             ( B . 4 )  
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Comparing equation (B.5) with 
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Then the solutions of  t π  and  1 + t t E π  are given by:   24
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It is straightforward to solve for  t y  and  1 + t ty E  in substituting the solutions of  t π  and  1 + t t Eπ  
given by (B.8) and (B.9) respectively into equation (29) and the conditional expectations of 
equation (29) for period t+1: 
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In order to find the equilibrium solution of current and expected future asset prices,  t A  and 
1 + t tA E  respectively, we use the reduced form of asset pricing equation. The latter is obtained in 
using equations (27), (29), (37) and (A.1) to eliminate  t y ,  1 + t ty E  and  t w  in equation (15)9. Then, 
substituting the solutions of  t π  and  1 + t t E π , given by equations (B.8) and (B.9), into the resulting 
asset pricing equation yields:  
                                                           
9 We can alternatively use equation (A.5), but then we have to do some algebra to rewrite it in the form of equation 
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Rearranging the terms in equation (B.12) and after some simplifications, we obtain the difference 
equation of asset prices as follows: 
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Under the hypothesis of rational expectations, we assume that the solutions of current and 
expected future asset prices take the following form: 
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According to equation (4), we can write  
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Taking conditional expectations of equation (B.15) and using then equations (B.16)-(B.18) to 
eliminate 
π ε 1 + t t E  
d
t t E 1 + ε  and 
e
t t E 1 + ε  in the resulting equation give:   26
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Substituting  1 + t tA E  defined by (B.19) into equation (B.13) leads to  
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Rearranging the terms in equation (B.20), we have: 
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Solving equations (B.22)-(B.25) yields the solution of the indeterminate coefficients as follows: 
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Then, substituting the solutions of  0 χ ,  1 χ ,  2 χ  and  3 χ  into equations (B.14) and (B.15) leads to 
the equilibrium solutions for  t A  and  1 + t tA E :  
.
] ) 1 ( )[ (
] ) ( ) ( )[ (
        
) ( ] ) 1 ( )[ (
} ] ) 1 ( [ ) 1 ( { ) (
2
2 1 2 1 1
1 1
2
1 1 2 1
2 1 2 1
2 1
2 1 2 1 1
2 1
2
2 1 2 1
*
1 1 2 1
π ε
λδ θ λ βρ θ ρ γ α α α α
ρ θ λδ β α γ λδ θ λδ θ λ θ α γ λδθ α α
ε
ρ γ α α α
α α
ε
ρ γ α α α α
α α
λδ θ λ β θ γ α α α
λ β θ γ π β λδθ γ α α
t
h s h s












+ − − − +








+ − − − +





] ) 1 ( )[ (
] ) ( ) ( )[ ( ) (




] ) 1 ( )[ ( ) 1 )( (
2
2 1 2 1 1
1 1
2
1 1 2 1
2 1 2 1
2 1




1 1 2 1 2 1
*
1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1
1
π ε ρ
λδ θ λ βρ θ ρ γ α α α α
ρ θ λδ β α γ λδ θ λδ θ λ θ α γ λδθ α α
ε
ρ γ α α α
ρ α α
ε
ρ γ α α α α
ρ α α
β θ λδ θ λ θ γ α α α
λ β θ α α γ π β α α λδθ γ
t s
h s h s












+ − − − +








− + − − +





Akram, Q. Farooq and Øyvind Eitrheim (2008), “Flexible inflation targeting and financial stability: Is it 
enough to stabilise inflation and output?” Journal of Banking & Finance, forthcoming.  
Alexandre, Fernando and Pedro Bação (2005), “Monetary policy, asset prices, and uncertainty”, 
Economics Letters 86, pp. 37–42.  
Batini, N., Justiniano, A., Levine, P., Pearlman, J. (2006) “Robust inflation-forecast-based rules to shield 
against indeterminacy”, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 13 (9–10), pp. 1491–1526. 
Bean, C. (2003), “Asset prices, financial imbalances and monetary policy: are inflation targets enough?”,  
BIS Working Papers, no 140.  
Bernanke, Ben & Mark Gertler (1999), “Monetary policy and asset prices volatility”, Federal Reserve 
Bank of Kansas City Economic Review 84, pp. 17-51.   28
Bernanke, Ben & Mark Gertler (2001), “Should Central Bank respond to movements in asset prices?”, 
American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 91, pp. 253-257. 
Bernanke, Ben, Mark Gertler, and Simon Gilchrist (1999), “The Financial Accelerator in a Quantitative 
Business Cycle Framework”, in John B. Taylor and Michael Woodford, eds., Handbook of 
Macroeconomics, Vol. 1, Part C, pp. 1341-1393. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, North-Holland. 
BIS (2007), “Uncertainties of world economy”, 77th Annual Report, 24 June 2007. For full report, see 
http://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2007e.htm.  
Brainard, W. (1967), “Uncertainty and the effectiveness of policy”, American Economic Review 57 (2), 
pp. 411–425. 
Brock, W.A., Durlauf, S.N., West, K.D. (2007), “Model uncertainty and policy evaluation: some theory 
and empirics”, Journal of Econometrics 136 (2), pp. 629–664. 
Buiter W. H. and N. Panigirtzoglou (2003), “Overcoming the Zero Bound on Nominal Interest Rates with 
Negative Interest on Currency: Gesell’s Solution”, Economic Journal, 113, pp. 723-746. 
Cecchetti, S., Genberg H., Lipsky J. & Wadhwani, S. (2000), “Asset prices and Central Bank policy”,  
Center for Economic Research, London. 
Cecchetti, S., Genberg, H., and S. Wadhwani (2003), “Asset prices in a flexible inflation targeting 
framework”, in Asset price bubbles, W. Hunter, G. Kaufmann and M. Pomerleano (eds.), The MIT 
Press: Cambridge. Bernanke, Ben, Mark Gertler, and Simon Gilchrist (1999), “The Financial 
Accelerator in a Quantitative Business Cycle Framework.” in John B. Taylor and Michael Woodford, 
eds., Handbook of Macroeconomics, Vol. 1, Part C, pp. 1341-1393. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, 
North-Holland 
Clarida R., Gali J. & Gertler M. (1999), “The science of monetary policy: a new Keynesian 
Perspective”, Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 37, pp. 1661-1707. 
Claudio Borio & Philip Lowe (2002), “Asset prices, financial and monetary stability: exploring the nexus, 
paper presented at the BIS Conference on Changes in risk through time: measurement and policy 
options”, BIS Working Papers (2002) (114) July. 
Conover, Mitchell, Gerald R. Jensen & Robert R. Johnson (1999), “Monetary Environments and 
International Stock Returns”, Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 23, N. 9, pp. 1357-1381. 
Disyatat, Piti (2005), “Inflation targeting, asset prices and financial imbalances: conceptualizing the 
debate”, BIS Working Papers No. 168.  
Fama, Eugene (1981), “Stock Returns, Real Activity, Inflation and Money”, American Economic Review, 
Vol. 71, No. 4, pp. 545-65. 
Filardo, A. (2000), “Monetary policy and asset prices”, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic 
Review Third quarter: pp. 11–37. 
Filardo, A. (2004), “Monetary policy and asset price bubbles: calibrating the monetary policy tradeoffs”, 
BIS Working Paper No. 155. 
Giannoni, Marc P. & Michael Woodford (2003a), “Optimal Interest-Rate Rules: I. General Theory”, 
NBER Working Paper No. 9419.  
Giannoni, Marc P. & Michael Woodford (2003b), “Optimal Interest-Rate Rules: II. Applications”, NBER 
Working Paper No. 9420.  
Giannoni, Marc P. (2002), “Does Model Uncertainty Justify Caution? Robust Optimal Monetary Policy in 
a Forward-Looking Model”, Macroeconomic Dynamics, Vol. 6(1), pp. 111-44.  
Giannoni, Marc P. (2007), “Robust optimal monetary policy in a forward-looking model with parameter 
and shock uncertainty”, Journal of Applied Econometrics, Vol. 22(1), pp. 179-213. 
Gilchrist, Simon & Masashi Saito (2008), “Expectations, Asset Prices, and Monetary Policy: The Role of 
Learning”, in Asset Prices and Monetary Policy, Edited by John Y. Campbell, University of Chicago 
Press, Forthcoming. 
Gilchrist, Simon and John V. Leahy (2002), “Monetary Policy and Asset Prices”, Journal of Monetary 
Economics 49, 75-97. 
Giordani, P., Söderlind, P. (2004), “Solution of macromodels with Hansen–Sargent robust policies: some 
extensions”, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 28 (12), pp. 2367–2397.   29
Hansen, Lars Peter & Thomas J. Sargent (2001), “Acknowledging misspecification in macroeconomic 
theory”, Review of Economic Dynamics 4 (3), pp. 519–535. 
Hansen, Lars Peter & Thomas J. Sargent (2003), “Robust Control of Forward-Looking Models”, Journal 
of Monetary Economics, 50, pp. 581-604.  
Hansen, Lars Peter & Thomas J. Sargent (2007), Robustness, Princeton University Press, New York. 
Kontonikas, Alexandros and Alberto Montagnoli (2006), “Optimal Monetary Policy and Asset Price 
Misalignments”, Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 53, Iss. 5, pp. 636-54. 
Kontonikas, Alexandros and Christos Ioannidis (2005), “Should Monetary Policy Respond to Asset Price 
Misalignments?”, Economic Modelling, Vol. 22, Iss. 6, pp. 1105-21.  
Leitemo, Kai and Ulf Söderström (2008a), “Robust Monetary Policy in the New Keynesian Framework”, 
Forthcoming in Macroeconomic Dynamics, Vol. 12, Supplement S1, pp 126-135. 
Leitemo, Kai and Ulf Söderström (2008b), “Robust Monetary Policy in a Small Open Economy”, 
Forthcoming in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control.  
Levin, Andrew T. and John C. Williams (2003), “Robust monetary policy with competing reference 
models”, Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 50, Issue 5, pp. 945-975. 
McCallum, B.T., Nelson, E. (1999), “An optimizing IS-LM specification for monetary policy and 
business cycle analysis”, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 31, pp. 296–316. 
McCallum, Bennet (1983), “On Non-Uniqueness in Rational Expectations Models”, Journal of Monetary 
Economics, Vol. 11, pp. 139-168. 
Onatski, Alexei and James H. Stock (2002), “Robust Monetary Policy under Model Uncertainty in a Small 
Model of the U.S. Economy”, Macroeconomic Dynamics, Vol. 6 (1), pp. 85-110.  
Svensson, Lars E. O. & Michael Woodford (2004) “Implementing Optimal Policy through Inflation-
Forecast Targeting”, in Ben S. Bernanke & Michael Woodford (ed.), The Inflation Targeting Debate. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Tetlow, Robert J. (2006), “Monetary Policy, Asset Prices and Misspecfication : the Robust Approach to 
Bubbles with Model Uncertainty”, in Issues in Inflation Targeting. Ottawa: Bank of Canada, 2006. 
Tetlow, Robert J. and Peter von zur Muehlen (2004), “Avoiding Nash Inflation: Bayesian and robust 
responses to model uncertainty”, Review of Economic Dynamics, Vol. 7 (4), pp. 869-899. 
Walsh, Carl E. (2004), “Robustly Optimal Instrument Rules and Robust Control: An Equivalence Result”, 
Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 36(6), pp. 1105-1113. 
 